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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLENN T. SEAL and ZELMA T. SEAL, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
MAPLETON CITY CORPORATION, a Municipal 
Corporation, by and through its Mayor 
and Board of City Councilmen, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15948 
This is an action by the plaintiffs and appellants for a 
Writ of Mandamus to compel the respondent to approve plans for 
the development of a subdivision or, in the alternative, for 
alleged damages for the taking of property by eminent domain, 
without just compensation. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court, at the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case, 
denied the appellants' request for a Writ of Mandamus, dismissed 
the appellants' claim for alleged damages, for lack of evidence, 
and granted respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, no 
cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
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the judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At all times material hereto, appellants, Glenn T. Seal and 
Zelma T. Seal, were husband and wife, and were the owners of 
a certain tract of land, consisting of approximately 19.5 acres, 
located within the corporate limits of respondent, Mapleton City 
Corporation, hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "City". 
(Exhibits 12, 13, 20, 24) 
Being desirous of developing the aforesaid land into a 
subdivision, appellants first submitted to the Planning Commission 
of Mapleton City a request for the re-zoning thereof from zoning 
classification A-2 (agricultural zone) to zoning classification 
RA-2 (residential agricultural zo:1e), which request was approved 
by the Planning Commiss~o:1 a~d fcrwarded to the City Council 
on or about November 13, l97 ~. (Ex~ibits 20 and 12; TR., pp. 
60, 62, 138) The Council discussed the request in its meeting 
on November 19, 1974, and schedul~d a public hearing on the 
matter for December 17, l :174. (E·c'c.cbi ': 44) At the public hear-
ing on the scheduled date, it Nas noted by members of the Planning 
Commision that a plan should also be submitted within sixty to 
ninecy days recommending certain changes in provisions of the 
Master Plan as they related to subject property. It was also 
noted that twelve other adjoining property owners had indicated 
a desire and intention to submit similar requests for zone changes 
with respect to their properties. (Exhibit 44) 
At the City Council meeting which immediately followed the 
public hearing, it was moved that the Council approve the request 
-2-
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for zone change, but the motion died for want of a second, and 
the matter was deferred until the next Council meeting when it 
was anticipated that two absent Council members would be present. 
(Exhibit 44) At the next Council meeting, on January 7, 1975, 
the motion was renewed and, one Councilman still being absent, 
the vote taken was two in favor of the zone change and two against, 
whereupon the Mayor broke the tie by voting for the change and 
the motion carried. (Exhibit 24, 44; TR., pp. 63, 165) 
Under Section 7-6-2 (2) of the Mapleton City Code, the 
Residential Agricultural Zone (RA-2) permits Planned Dwelling 
Units, but only when approved by the City Council after receiving 
the recommendations of the Planning Commission. At the next 
meeting of the City Council, therefore, on January 21, 1975, it 
was observed that the appellant might be proceeding with expensive 
engineering and planning for the subdividing of his acreage and 
Coun~ilman Korth was directed to consult with Mr. Seal and assure 
his understanding that the re-zoning of his property in no way 
committed the City to the approval of his subdivision plans. At 
the same time, the City Engineer explained that the existing water 
lines supplying that part of the City might be inadequate to 
meet the requirements of the subdivision and a computer study was 
authorized to determine the impact of extensive building in the 
area on the water system. (Exhibits 8 and 44) 
At some point in time, contemporaneous with the foregoing 
events, and at a closed "Executive" session of the City Planning 
Commission, of which Mr. Seal was an Alternate Member, a decision 
was reached to recommend to the City Council that certain roads 
-3-
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be deleted from the City Master Plan in order to accommodate the 
appellants1 proposed subdivision. This decision was not formally 
entered in the official minutes of the Planning Commission until 
July 9, 1975, having previously been forwarded to the City Council. 
(Exhibits 19, 22, 44; TR., pp. 116-117, 198-189, 235) 
The Master Street Plan of Mapleton City, adopted in 1958, 
(Exhibit 18) contemplated concentrated growth in the center of 
town, with gradual and orderly extensions outward. (TR., pp. 156, 
204-205) Consistent therewith, a proposal of the Planning Commission 
to re-zone the entire Northwest sector of the City for residential 
purposes was rejected by the Council. (TR., pp. 157, 158, 208) 
Similarly, a proposed subdivision applied for by one "Carnesecca", 
prior to the Seal application, and consisting of 240 homes located 
in close proximity to the Seal subdivision, had ?reviously been 
turned down by the Council. (TR., pp. 181, 208) This City policy 
was affirmed by the Planning Commission at a Planning Commission 
meeting held on February 12, 1975, where, on a prevailing vote 
of three to two, the Commission expressed its consensus as favoring 
the continuance of development along existing streets, rather 
than planned development elsewhere. (Exhibit 35, 44; TR., pp. 215, 
216) 
On April 9, 1975, a Preliminary Plat :or appellants' 
proposed subdivison was presented to the City Planning Commission 
by one Denny Murray, Mr. Seal's representative, who was also 
himself an Alternate Member of the Planning Commission. (Exhibits 
13, 31, and 32; TR., pp. 251 and 252) A motion to approve the 
preliminary plat and recommend the same for approval to the City 
Council carried, but upon the express condition that the water 
-4-
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problem be resolved. 
231, 253) 
(Exhibit 32; TR., pp. 66, 67, 100, 192-193, 
At a meeting of the City Council held May 20, 1975, the 
appellants requested that the Council review the preliminary 
plat for the purpose of obtaining a "general feeling from the 
Council", so they could determine whether or not to proceed with the 
Final Plat. (Exhibit 26; TR., pp. 194, 195, 265, 266) The plan 
called for the development of forty-four (44)homes on lots 
ranging from one-third acre to one-half acre, plus, and would 
conflict and interfere with the proposed 1400 North and 
700-800 West Streets designated on the Master Street Plan. 
(TR., pp. 194, 195, 265, 266) 
It was noted at the meeting that a public hearing would be 
required before any streets could be deleted from the Master 
Plan. (TR., pp. 265, 266) In general terms, the appellants 
proposed to limit construction in the proposed subdivision to 
five homes per year for the first three years, with no restrictions 
thereafter and to offer a lot in the subdivision to the City 
for a recreational area. In the same meeting, the Council also 
discussed a proposed Interim Development Zone and took the Seal 
subdivision matter under advisement. (Exhibit 26; TR., pp. 184-185) 
On June 3, 1975, the appellants appeared before the City 
Council to discuss the use of an irrigation well owned by them 
on other property, as a possible means of resolving the water 
distribution problem. The appellants indicated that they would 
retain title to the well, but if they should ever decide to sell 
it, the City would be given the first right of refusal to purchase 
-5-
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the same. (Exhibit 27; TR., pp. 292, 294, 373) The Council 
indicated that the water problem was one of distribution rather 
than supply, because smaller water lines leading from the City's 
water sources empty into larger pipes within the City and the 
flow of water in the larger pipes is limited to the quantity 
which the smaller pipes can convey. (TR., pp. 24, 33, 34, 72) 
On July 1, 1975, a public hearing was held to consider 
the recommendation of the City Planning Commission that the 
Council delete from the Master Plan those streets conflicting 
with or affected by the proposed subdivision. At the subsequent 
meeting of the City Council, immediately following, a motion was 
made to de~ such streets from the Master Plan, but was defeated 
by a vote of three to two, whereupon, the Mayor appointed a 
Special Committee to discuss the matter further with the appellants 
and to determine the effect of the Interim Development Zone, if 
adopted, on future development. (Exhibit 36) In general terms, 
Mr. Seal proposed to the Special Committee certain actions designed 
to meet the City's objections to the subdivision, including, among 
others, a first option to purchase the appellants' irrigation well, 
if the appellants should ever determine to sell the same; the 
conveyance to the City, for recreational purposes, of a single lot 
in the subdivision, with the express condition that the lot could 
not be traded or sold for the purpose of acquiring a larger 
tract for recreational purposes in any other area; and an escrow 
arrangement to insure the installation of off-site improvements 
by depositing the sum of $700.00 as and when each lot were sold 
in the proposed subdivision, for the construction of a hard 
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surface road, curb, gutter, and sidewalk as each home was con-
structed, all of which proposals fell short of satisfying the 
requirements of the ordinance and meeting the objections of the 
Council. (Exhibits 36 and 23; TR., pp. 292, 293, 294, 329) 
After another month of study and consideration, the City 
Council met again on August 5, 1975, after a public hearing 
relating to the establishment of an Interim Development Zone, 
at which time a motion was made to approve the Preliminary Plat 
of the appellants' proposed subdivision. The motion was defeated 
by a majority vote of three to two. (Exhibit 29, 44; TR., pp. 269, 
332-333) Among the plethora of reasons for refusing to approve 
the appellants' preliminary plat, are the following, as set 
forth in a letter from the City to the appellants dated October 
6, 1977. (Exhbit 43): 
1. In the judgment of the City, the approval of the pro-
posed subdivision would result in the impairment of City Services 
to the other inhabitants of the City and necessitate the imposi-
tion of an impossible tax burden on all City residents, in order 
to provide necessary municipal services. 
2. The proposed subdivision, as represented by the Pre-
liminary Plat, conflicts with the Master Street Plan of the City, 
and a proposal to delete the affected streets from the Master 
Plan was rejected. 
3. No "Final" Plat of the proposed subdivision was ever 
submitted to the City prior to the commencement of the appellants' 
action, as required by provisions of the Mapleton City Code and the 
time for submitting such "Final" Plat, after approval by the 
-7-
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Planning Commission of the Preliminary Plat and all extensions 
granted in connection therewith, had long expired. 
4. The City's water distribution and delivery system is 
not adequate to accommodate the requirements of the proposed 
subdivision without substantially impairing the ability of the 
City to fulfill the service requirements of present water-using 
inhabitants of the City and without imposing upon the City and its 
taxpayers an inordinate financial burden beyond the capacity of 
the City to meet. (Exhibit 8, 44) The proposals of the appellants 
for use of their irrigation water well for culinary purposes was 
carefully analyzed. 
5. The proposed subdivision did not comply with the Utah 
County Health Department regulations regarding soil percolation 
tests for septic tanks. The Utah State Board of Health had 
already refused to approve the installation of septic tanks in 
the proposed "Carnesecca" subdivision which showed a more 
favorable drainage classification than land embraced in the 
Seal proposed subdivision. 
120, 181, 208, 209, 210) 
(Exhibit 33; TR., pp. 117, 118, 
On June 21, 1977, more than two years after the "conditional" 
approval of the appellants' Preliminary Plat by the City Planning 
Commission, and long after the pending action had been commenced, 
the appellants belatedly submitted to the City Council a purported 
"Final" plat of the subdivision, which was never filed with the 
Planning Commission, as required by ordinance. (Exhibit 38; 
TR., pp. 196, 198, 203, 204, 245, 255, 258; Mapleton City Code, 
1971, Sections 9-6-3, 9-6-4, 9-6-5) 
-8-
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No appeal was ever taken by the appellants to the Board of 
Adjustment of Mapleton City from any action taken or decision 
made by the City Council as provided by Ordinance. (Mapleton 
City Code, 1971, Section 7-4-3) 
Under this state of facts, Judge Sorensen, while presiding 
over the case, ruled at pre-trial, that the appellants had not 
exhausted their "administrative remedies" (Court file Minute 
Entry December 17, 1976). Following that ruling, the appellants 
asked for a change of judge and Judge Sam, to whom the case was 
assigned, out of an abundance of consideration for the appellants, 
set the case for trial and heard the same for approximately five 
days and until the appellants rested their case. 
The appellants, at no time filed any verified claim for 
damages allegedly s•lstained by them as a result of any acts or 
omissions of the respondent, either before or after the filing 
of their Complaint in this action, and offered no evidence what-
ever at the trial of any damage sustained. (Affidavit of City 
Recorder attached to respondent's motion for Summary Judgment; 
TR. I pp. 426) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANTS HAVE NOT FOLLOWED THE PROCEDURES 
SPECIFIED OR COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIFl!1ENTS OF THE 
MAPLETON CITY CODE RELATING TO SUBDIVISIONS AND HAVE 
NOT EXHAUSTED THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. 
Contrary to the position taken by the appellants at trial, 
the inclusion of a particular tract of land in a particular "zone" 
does not, automatically, entitle the property owner to approval 
-9-
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of any subdivisional plans he may submit or to the issuance of 
blanket building permits. Section 7-6-2 (2) of the Mapleton City 
Code permits "planned dwelling units" in Residential Agricultural 
Zone RA-2, but only when approved by the City Council after 
receiving the recommendations of the Planning Commission. The 
appellants' responsibilities, therefore, did not end when the 
zoning classification of their property was changed from Agri-
cultural zone A-2 to Residential Agricultural zone RA-2 on January 7, 
1975. (Exhibit 24) The procedures and requirements for securing 
approval of subdivisional plans are spelled out clearly in 
Sections 9-6-1 through 9-6-16 of the Mapleton City Code, 1971. 
The record before this Court demonstrates graphically that there 
was barely more than a semblance of compliance by the appellants 
with the requirements of the Ordinance. First of all, the 
appellants and the subdivision which they proposed clearly fall 
within the definition of subdividers and subdivisions set out 
in Section 9-6-1 of the Mapleton City Code. Second, Section 
9-6-2 of the Code provides that no person shall subdivide any 
tract of land nor sell, offer for sale, or exchange any parcel 
of land which is part of a subdivision unless there shall first 
be recorded a plat of such land which has been prepared and 
recorded in compliance with the requirements of the ordinance. 
Section 9-6-4 of the Code requires the subdivider to file a 
"Preliminary Plat" and provides that the Planning Commission 
or the City Council may approve or reject such plat or grant 
approval on conditions stated. This Section further provides 
that approval of the Preliminary Plat by the Planning Commission 
-10-
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or City Council shall not constitute "final" acceptance of the 
subdivision by the Planning Commission or the City Council. 
Subparagraph (C) of the same Section provides that approval of 
the Preliminary Plat by the Planning Commission shall be valid 
for a maximum of sixty (60) days after approval, unless upon 
application of the developer, the Planning Commission shall have 
granted an extension and if the "final" plat has not been recorded 
within the time required by the Ordinance, the Preliminary Plat 
must again be submitted to the Planning Commission for re-approval. 
In this case, the Preliminary Plat "conditionally" approved by 
the Planning Commission and referred voluntarily by the appellants 
to the City Council for the Council's review, was invalid at 
the time of the commencement of trial and at the present time, 
because no "final" plat was filed with the Council or recorded 
within the time required by the Ordinance, including the sixty 
day extension granted to the appellants by the Planning Commission 
and no "Final" Plat has, in fact, ever been filed with the 
Planning Commission or recorded. Further, the condition upon 
which the "Preliminary" Plat was approved by the Planning Commission 
has never been resolved. (TR., pp. 196, 198, 203, 204, 245, 255, 
258; Mapleton City Code, 1971, Sections 9-6-3, 4, 5) 
Section 9-6-5 {A) of the Code provides that after compliance 
with the provisions of the Ordinance relating to the "Preliminary" 
Plat, the subdividers shall submit to the Planning Commission a 
"Final" Plat with two black and white prints of the subdivison. 
Such "Final" Plat has never been submitted to the Planning 
Commission and a purported "Final" Plat was tendered to the City 
Council only after approximately 28 months had elapsed after 
-11-
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the conditional approval of the "Preliminary" Plat by the Planning 
Commission and approximately one year after the pending action 
was commenced. In fact, the appellants have never submitted to 
the City Council a "Final" Plat approved by the Planning Commission, 
incorporating and complying with the requirements of a "Final" 
Plat as set forth in Section 9-6-5 of the Code. 
Although not technically required to approve or disapprove 
the "Preliminary" Plat, in view of the provisions of Section 9-6-4 
(B) of the City Code, the City Cou~cil, at the request of and as an 
accommodation to the appellants, nevertheless reviewed and advised 
the appellants of their disapproval of the same, citing multiple 
reasons therefor. There was never any follow-through by the 
appellants by w-ay of proper submission of a "Final" Plat 
for review and consideration by the Council. 
Further, no action taken or omitted by the City Council, 
whether considered advisory or otherwise, was ever the subject 
of an appeal by the appellants to the Board of Adjustment of the 
City, which is empowered under the provisions of Section 7-4-3 of 
the Mapleton City Code to hear and decide appeals where it is 
alleged by the appellants that there is error in any order, 
requirement, decision, or refusal made in the enforcement of 
the Ordinance. 
Judge Sorensen in his ruling at pre-trial as noted in the 
Court file Minute Entry of December 17, 1976, and Judge Sam, in 
his Findings and Decision of June 14, 1978, properly ruled that 
the appellants never did exhaust their administrative remedies 
prior to the commencement of suit. 
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The well-established doctrine of "Exhaustion of Administra-
tive Remedies" requires that where a remedy before an administra-
tive agency is provided, relief must be sought by exhausting this 
remedy before the Courts will act. (2 Am. Jur. 2nd 426, Section 
595.) This doctrine is well-established, is a cardinal principle 
of practically universal application and no one is entitled to 
judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the 
prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. (2 Am. 
Jur. 2nd 428, Section 595, citing: MACCAULEY v. WATERMAN S. S. 
CORP., 327 US 540, 90 I.Ed 839, 66 Set 712) 
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
sometimes said to rest upon the presumption that the adminis-
trative agency, if given a complete chance to pass upon the 
matter, will decide correctly and is merely one aspect of the 
broader doctrine which requires final administrative action as 
a prerequisite of judicial review. (FLORENTINE v. DARIEN, 142 
Conn. 415, 115 A. 2d 328; THOMAS v. RAMBERG, 240 Minn. 1, 60 
NW 2nd 18; CAVANAUGH v. UNDERWRITERS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
(Tex. Civ. App.) 231 sw 2nd 753) The doctrine has been applied 
in those cases where the plaintiff has altogether failed to invoke 
his administrative remedies, as in this case (YAKUS v. United 
States, 321 US 414, 88 LEd 834, 64 Set 660; WILLIAMS v. BANKERS 
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 80 Ariz. 294, 297 P 2d 344) and 
in those cases where the plaintiff has failed to properly apply 
for a license or permit or for variation of zoning restrictions 
imposed by a City. 
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POINT II 
THE APPELLANTS HAVE MADE NO SHOWING THAT ACTIONS OF THE 
RESPONDENT WERE ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS AND THE RECORD, 
TO THE CONTRARY, DISCLOSES THAT, IN FACT, THEY WERE NOT. 
Whether actions and decisions of the City Council in dis-
approving the "Preliminary" Plat of the appellants after its 
"conditional" approval by the Planning Commission are considered 
"advisory" or otherwise, there is not a scintilla of evidence in 
the record in support of the appellants' claim that such actions 
or decisions were "arbitrary or capricious". Technical deficiencies 
in the procedures followed by the appellants in filing their 
"Preliminary" Plat and in failing to file any "Final" Plat, aside, 
the record affirmatively shows that the proposal of the appellants 
was thoroughly reviewed and given careful consideration by the 
Council over an extended period of time, and the action taken 
by the respondent was fully warranted and justified by the facts. 
First, it should be noted that the Preliminary Plat was 
approved "conditionally" by the Planning Commission and that 
condition specifically required that the recognized water problem 
be resolved. The fact that the appellants made certain proposals 
relating to the use of water from their irrigation well, which 
were unacceptable to the respondent, did not constitute a reso-
lution of the problem. The City tried strenuously to work out 
the problem with the appellants and appointed a Special Committee 
to undertake that endeavor. (Exhibits 13, 32, 36, 23; TR., pp. 32) 
It was recognized that a solution of the water problem was essential. 
(TR., pp. 72) The City Engineer, Mr. Wilson, advised the City 
that the culinary water distribution system could not accomo-
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date the subdivision without impairing water pressure and supply 
to the other inhabitants of the City, (Exhibits 43, 44; TR., 
pp. 24) and the evidence discloses that although some six inch 
and some eight inch lines border the proposed subdivision, they 
are fed from the water sources by lines of a smaller size which, 
in effect, limits the quantity of water which the larger pipes 
can convey, to the quantity of water the smaller pipes can carry. 
(TR., pp. 24, 33, 34) The proposals made by the appellants, 
most of which were submitted after this action was commenced, 
did not, in the judgment of the Council, offer a viable and 
acceptable solution to the problem. The problem was, in fact, 
never resolved. (TR., pp. 100) 
Second, there was an obvious conflict between the "Pre-
lirninary" Plat of the subdivision and the Master Street Plan 
(Exhibits 2, 18) and an arnend~ent of that plan was imperative 
if the subdivions were to be approved. 
Section 2-2-9 of the Mapleton City Code, 1971, provides 
that in order to preserve the integrity of the official map 
no permit shall be issued by the Building Inspector for any 
building or structure or part thereof on any land located be-
tween the mapped lines of any street as shown on the official 
Map and that any person ~grieved by his inability to obtain 
such a permit may appeal to the Board of Adjustment. Further, 
Section 2-2-11 of the Code provides: 
"Whenever the Planning Commission shall have certified 
a Master Plan or any part thereof to the Council, and 
the Council shall have adopted the plan, thenceforth 
all streets, arks, or other public grounds, public 
buildin s or structures, and publ~c ut~ ~t~es, w ether 
publicly or privately owned, shall be constructe ~n 
accordance to, 3nd in conformity with the plan. 
(TR., pp. 91, 152, 187)" 
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Considering the proposed addition of a multitude of new homes 
in the area and the traffic problems anticipated therefrom, the 
Council, in its judgment concluded that the deletion of the affected 
streets from the Master Plan was not in the interest of the City 
and its inhabitants, and therefore declined to amend the Master 
Plan to accomplish that objective. (TR., pp. 106, 111, 234) 
Third, no percolation tests were ever provided by the 
appellants nor were the sewer problems in connection therewith 
ever resolved. While there was some testimony to the ef::ct 
that the area embraced in the proposed subdivision was adaptable 
to septic tanks (TR., pp. 186), it was admitted by the same 
witness that the adequacy of soil conditions for septic tanks, 
could not be determined without soil percolation tests, TR., pp. 186) 
yet no such tests were ever made (~R., pp. 123). On the other 
hand, an overlay showing salls a~d drainage co~ditions of both 
the "Carnesecca" and "Seal" ;:>roposed subdivisons disclosed that 
the "Carnesecca" subdivision land was classified as "good" 
whereas the "Seal" land was classif~ed as only "fair", yet the 
State of Utah found that the drainage in the "Carnesecca" tract 
was inadequate for septic tanks and refused to sanction the 
subdivision. (Exhibit 33; TR., pp. 208, 209, 210) On the basis 
of these facts, the City was fully justified in concluding that 
sewage disposal problems incident to the subdivision were not 
resolved. 
Inasmuch as no "Final" Plat was ever filed with the Planning 
Commission or the City Council before the pending action was 
commenced, and inasmuch as the purported "Final" Plat filed with 
the City Council on June 21, 1977, long after the pending action was 
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begun, was clearly deficient in meeting the requirements for 
a "Final" Plat, including dedication of streets, percolation 
tests, the installation of permanent survey stakes, and the 
required approval of the Planning Commission and Engineer, 
there was no opportunity afforded the City Council to review 
and approve or disapprove a properly executed "Final" Plat. 
(Exhibit 38; TR., pp. 25~ 259) 
Fourth, from policy considerations alone, it was within 
the power of the City to control growth in given areas, if that 
had been the City's purpose, in order to bring about an orderly 
development of the City's large land area compatible with 
community needs and the City's ability to meet the financial 
burden incident to such development. In the case of 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF SONOMA COUNTY v. THE CITY 
OF PETALUMA, reported at 522 Federal 2nd 897, the City appealed 
from a decision of the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California which had voided, as unconsti-
tutional, certain aspects of such a developmental plan. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the District Court on August 13, 1975, and certiorari was 
denied by the United States Supreme Court on February 23, 1976. 
(96 S.Ct. 1148) 
Although the burdenwas upon the appellantsto establish by 
competent proof that the actions of the respondent were "arbitrary 
and capricious", there is nothing in the record to support the 
appellants'claim and the Court, in its decision of June 14, 1978, 
so found. 
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POINT III 
THERE IS NO BASIS WHATEVER IN THE RECORD UPON WHICH 
THE APPELLANTS CAN ESTABLISH ANY CLAIM FOR DAMAGES 
AS AGAINST THE RESPONDENT. 
First of all, as established by the uncontroverted Affidavit 
of the City Recorder filed in support of the respondent's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, no verified claim for damages was ever pre-
sented to or filed with the respondent by the appellants, and such 
filing is a condition precedent to any enforceable claim against 
the City for money damages. After providing for certain excep-
tions which are not applicable to the appellants1 claim, title 
10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides: 
" ..• Every claim other than claims above mentioned, 
against any city or town must be presented, properly 
itemized or described and verified as to correctness 
by the claimant or his agent, to the governing body 
within one (1) year after the last item of such account 
or claim accrued .... " 
The same Section f~rther provides that no action shall be 
maintained against any City or town for damages or injury to 
persons or property unless it appears that the claim for which 
the action was brought was presented as aforesaid, and that 
such governing body did not, within ninety (90) days thereafter, 
audit and allow the same. 
The appellants have never made any claim that they have ever 
filed such a verified claim and under these conditions their 
claim for money damages cannot be entertained or sustained. 
The statutory right to recover, granted by Section 10-7-77, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, can be availed of only 
when there has been a compliance with the conditions upon which 
such right is conferred and one who seeks to enforce the right 
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must, by allegation and proof, bring himself within the condi-
tions prescribed thereby. (HAMILTON v. SALT LAKE CITY, 99 Utah 
362, 106 P. 2d 1028) 
The appellants in this case have claimed that the action of 
the respondent City in connection with the Preliminary Plat 
filed by the appellants was wrongful. That claim is, of itself, 
equivalent to a claim that the action or failure to act was 
tortious. 
In the case of DAHL v. SALT LAKE CITY, 45 Utah 544, 147 
P. 622, the Court observed that it should be noticed that 
the claims which must be presented before an action can be 
brought and successfully maintained thereon are divided into 
two classes: one class consisting of claims "for damages or 
injury alleged to have been caused by the defective, unsafe, 
dangerous or obstructed condition of any street, alley, cross-
walk, sidewalk, culvert, or bridge" which must be presented 
within thirty (30) days after the happening of such injury or 
damage, and the second class consisting of "every claim, other 
than the claims above mentioned", must be presented, properly 
itemized or described within one year after the last item of 
such account or claim accrued. 
Title 10-7-78, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, expressly provides: 
"It shall be a sufficient bar and answer to any action or 
proceeding against the City or town in any Court for the 
collection of any claim mentioned in Section 10-7-77, 
that such claim had not been presented to the governing 
body of such City or town in the manner and within the 
time specified in Section 10-7-77; ... " 
Implementing the foregoing Section, this Court, in HURLEY 
v. TOWN OF BINGHAM, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213, held that pre-
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sentation of a claim within the time fixed by law was a condition 
precedent to bringing action against the town and that failure 
to file a claim barred any action against the town and any consid-
eration of the claim by the town did not constitute a waiver 
of the filing thereof by the claimant. (See also THOMAS E. 
JEREMY EST. v. SALT LAKE CITY, 87 Utah 370, 49 P. 2nd 405) 
It should be noted, also, that the record is totally desti-
tute of any evidence whatever of any damage to the appellants 
by virtue of any acts or omissions of the respondent, and the 
Court, in its decision of June 14, 1978, so found. (TR. I pp. 426) 
Further, the decision of the City Council in matters of the kind 
now pending before this Court is "governmental" in nature and 
not proprietary and the City and its officers cannot be held 
accountable in damages by reason thereof. 
Title 63-30-3 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
(Governmental Immunity Act) provides: 
"Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all 
governmental entities shall be immune from suit for 
any injury which may result from the activities of 
said entities wherein said entity is engaged in the 
exercise and discharge of a governmental function." 
There follows certain exceptions, including quiet title 
actions, foreclosure actions, actions for injuries from 
negligent operation of motor vehicles, injuries caused by 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, bridges, 
or other structures, public buildings, or improvements, or injuries 
proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of employees 
of the City committed within the scope of their employment. The 
appellants have not brought themselves within the definition of 
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any of the foregoing exceptions and the general rule is, therefore, 
applicable. 
The test in deciding whether the government is acting in 
a proprietary or governmental capacity is whether the act is 
for the common good of all without the element of special 
corporate benefit or pecuniary profit. (DAVIS v. PROVO CITY 
CORP., 1 Utah 2nd 244, 265 P. 2d 415) and a City is liable 
in damages when it is negligent while acting in a proprietary 
capacity, but exempt from liabilty when it is negligent in the 
performance of governmental duties. The actions taken by the 
respondent in this case can only be characterized as "governmental" 
in nature. 
The appellants' claim of damages by reason of the alleged 
unlawful taking of property without just compensation, through 
eminent domain is equally without merit. 
In the first place, the respondent has brought no action 
against the appellants in the nature of aneminent domain 
proceeding, or otherwis~ and has not sought to obtain title to 
appellants' property. The appellants' claim can only be 
characterized as an attempt to establish by the judgment of 
this Court, that restrictions in the use of property imposed 
upon a property owner through the police power of a City 
constitutes an unlawful taking of that property. More 
specifically, the appellants' claim that because property is 
designated on a Master Street Plan of the City for future 
development and implementation and certain limitations are 
imposed relating to construction thereon, this constitutes 
an unlawful taking of property. This is not the case, and no 
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cases are cited which support that proposition. On the contrary, 
Section 2-2-8 of the Mapleton City Code, 1971, expressly refutes 
such a claim. That Section provides that the placing of any 
street or street lines upon the official map shall not in and 
of itself, constitute or be deemed to constitute the opening 
or establishment of any street or the taking or acceptance of 
any land for street purposes. If and when the City should 
determine to implement the Master Street Plan, in any area, and 
private property is required for that purpose, it can be assumed 
that the owner thereof will be compenstated therefor. Until 
then, the property has not been taken and the mere adoption of 
the Master Plan does not render such action compensable. 
On top of all of this, the appellants offered no evidence 
whatever, at trial, of any damage sustained by them as a result 
of responden~s actions. (TR., pp. 426) 
POINT IV 
THE OFFICE AND PURPOSE OF MANDk~S IS TO COMPEL LAWFUL 
ACTION BUT NOT TO DICTATE OR CONTROL THE CITY'S DECISIONS. 
~ public officer is in duty bound to exercise the 
judgment or discretion which is reposed in him by 
law. If he fails or refuses to do so, and does not 
act upon the subject or pass upon the question on 
which judgment or discretion is to be exercised, 
then the Writ of Mandamus may be used to enforce 
obedience to the law. In other words, when in matters 
involving discretion, the respondent refuses to act 
at all, mandamus may issue to move him to action and 
to exercise his discretion in the matter. 
(Citing SMYTH v. BUTTERS, 38 Utah 151, 112 P. 809) ... 
The relator in such case merely asks that the respondent 
make a decision one way or the other. He does not seek to 
use the Writ to compel or control the decision in any particu-
lar way, as will be seen, this cannot be done. (52 Am. Jur. 
2d 398, Section 77) 
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Although, as has been aeen, mandamus may be resorted 
to for the purpose of compelling the exercising of 
official discretion, the use of the Writ will not 
ordinarily be extended so as to interfere with the 
manner in which the discretion is exercised or to 
influence or coerce a particular determination. 
(Citing MCCARTEN v. SANDERSON, 11 Montana 407, 109 
P. 2dll08, 132 ALR 1229) It has been reiterated that 
in the absence of a capricious or arbitrary act, 
mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of 
official discretion or to alter or review action taken 
in the proper exercise of such discretion or judgment. 
(Citing SMYTH v. BUTTERS, 38 Utah 151, 112 P. 809) 
Thus, mandamus will not lie to control the discretion 
of the Court or judicial officer, or to compel its exercise 
in a particular manner, except in those rare instances 
where under the facts, it can be legally exercised in 
but one way, nor is it a proper remedy to control acts 
of governmental bodies when acting within the scope of 
their legal powers. (Citing GOODMAN v. MEADE, 162 
PA.Super. 587, 68A2nd 577). Mandamus is not an instru-
ment for the instruction of public officers as to the 
manner in ~hich they shall discharge duties which call 
for the exercise of discretion, as distinguished from the 
performance of ministerial duties. (Citing WOLF v. YOUNG, 
Texas Civil Appeals 277 SW 2nd 744) 
Mandamus is used to stimulate action pursuant to some 
legal duty, and is not to cause the respondent to un-do 
action already taken, or to correct or review such 
action however erroneous it may have been. (Citing 
STATE EX REL,ROBINSON v. HUTCHESON, 180 Tennessee 46, 
171 SW 2nd 282, 168 ALR 850) 
Mandamus is not a subsitute for, and cannot be resorted 
to in civil proceedings to serve the purpose of certiorari, 
appeal, or writ of error, and this is true even though 
there is no mode of review given by or available under 
the law ..•. (52 Am. Jur. 2nd 337, Section 9) 
Where there is no other adequate remedy, mandamus will 
issue to enforce performance of plain and imperative 
duties of aministerial character imposed by law upon 
administrative bodies. The writ will not issue to 
control judgment or discretion. Unless there has been 
a clear abuse of discretion, or the action of the 
agency was arbitrar¥• capricious! or prompted by wrong-
ful motives, where JUdgment or d scretion is reposed 
in an administrative agency and has, by that agency been 
exercised, courts are powerless to use the writ of 
mandamus to compel a different conclusion. (US EX REL. 
CHICAGO G.W.R. COMPANY v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 
294 us 50)" 
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The foregoing principles of law prevail in the State of Utah. 
In the case of TUTTLE v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
77 Utah 270, 285; 294 P 294, this Court said that mandate does 
not lie unless the relator or petitioner shows a clear legal 
right to performance of the act demanded and the plain duty of 
the officer, board, or tribunal to perform it, as demanded, and 
where the duty to perform the act is doubtful, or where a 
discretion is imposed or involved in the performance of it, 
mandate ordinarily will not compel the performance of it in 
a particular way. A Writ of Mandamus may be used to compel an 
inferior tribunal to act on a matter within its jurisdiction, 
but not to control its discretion while acting, nor to reverse 
its judgment when made. (HATHAWAY v. MCCONKIE, 85 Utah 21, 38 
P. 2d 300) 
The action of a p~lic ~fficer in a situation calling for 
the exercise of discretion is not reviewable by mandamus unless 
such officer has been guilty of clear and willful disregard of 
duty or acts with caprice or partiality. (STATE EX REL.BISHOP 
v. MOREHOUSE, 38 Utah 234, 112 P. 169) 
In distinguishing between ministerial duties and duties 
involving judgment or discretion, the general rule is that in 
matters involving interpretation of a statute, the officer or 
board acts with judgment and discretion. 
"A duty or act is ministerial in the sense herein 
intended when there is no room for the exercise of 
discretion, off~c~al or otherw~se, the performance 
be~ng required by direct and positive command of the law ... 
But a duty is regarded as involving the character of 
judgmen~ or discretion, and cannot be controlled by 
mandamus, where it is not thus plainly prescribed or 
depends upon a statute or statutes, the construction 
or application of which is not free from doubt .... 
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Where the duty is not plainly prescribed, but is to 
be gathered by doubtful inference from a statute or 
statutes of uncertain meaning, it is to be regarded 
as involving the character of judgment or discretion 
which may not be controlled by mandamus, even though 
the Court may deem the conclusion reached to be erroneous. 
(52 Am. Jur. 2nd 402, Section 80, 81, and 82)" 
The issuance of licenses or permits by boards and officers 
charged with that responsibility is a discretionary function. 
"Boards and officers charged with the duty or power of 
issuing licenses and permits usually exercise a discre-
tionary function in the matter. Their determination 
involves a judgment as to the right and fitness of the 
applicant and generally calls for examining evidence 
and passing upon questions of fact. Where such is the 
case, Courts may compel them to exercise their judgment 
or discretion, but will not attempt to control their 
discretion or compel them by mandamus to decide in a 
particular way. If in the proper exercise of their 
power they refuse a license or permit, the writ will 
not issue to reverse or review their decision. 
(ANNO: 20 ALR 1482; 29 ALR 41, 42; 53 ALR 149, 153; 
72 ALR 1339; 124 ALR 247, 249)" 
The foregoing rule which accords to officers and boards 
a status of judgment and discretion in the exercise of their 
powers in issuing permits a~d interpreting ordinances is adhered 
to by the Courts of this State. 
In NAYLOR v. SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 17 Utah 2nd 300, 
410 P. 2d 764, the Court said: 
"The (zoning) Commission being charged with the duty 
of carrying out these numerous and varied objectives 
must necessarily be allowed a wide latitude of dis-
cretion as to the manner in which they can best be 
attained. In conformity with well-established rules 
relating to t~e power of administrative bodies, it is 
to be assumed that they have some specialized knowledge 
of the conditions and the needs upon which the discharge 
of their duties depends. Because the law imposes this 
duty primarily upon the commission, and because of its 
presumed expertise in fulfiling that responsibility, 
the Court will not invade the province of the commission 
and substitute its judgment therefor; nor will it interfere 
w~th the preorogatives of the commission unless it is 
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shown to be so clearly in error that there is no rea-
sonable basis whatsoever to justify it and its action 
must therefore be regarded as capricious and arbitrary. 
(See also, GAY~ v. SALT LAKE COUNTY, 11 Utah 2nd 
307, 358 P. 2d 633)" 
The meaning of the terms "arbitrary and capricious" in connect-
ion with municipal zoning is succinctly set forth by the Court in 
JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES v. MULLEN, 214 Oregon 281; 330 P. 2d 5, as 
follows: 
"The terms "arbitrary and capricious" action when used in 
connection with determining the validity of action of 
municipal zoning authorities means willful and unrea-
soning action, without consideration and in disregard 
of facts and circumstances of the case, and where there 
is room for two opinions, the action is not arbitrary 
or capricious if exercised honestly and upon due consid-
eration even though it may be believed that an erroneous 
conclusion has been reached." 
Further, the burden of proving its right to a Writ of 
Mandamus rests upon the appellants and all presumptions are in 
favor of the respondent. When the appellants applied for a 
Writ of Mandamus, the burden of proving their entitlement there-
to rested upon them and all presumptions are against in them 
and in favor of the respondent. 
"The rule that the burden of proof rests upon the party 
who asserts the affirmative of an issue applies in 
mandamus proceedings. Thus, the burden is upon the 
applicant to show that his right to the issuance of 
the writ is clear and indisputable and, except as to 
allegations that are admitted by the answer or other-
wise, he must prove every fact that is the foundation 
of his proceeding. He must show an enforceable right; 
an imperative duty of the respondent to perform; the 
authority, ability and means of the respondent of 
performing his duty; the lack of another plain, speedy 
and adequate remedy; the performance or compliance 
with necessary conditions precedent, including, where 
necessary, a demand for performance and refusal thereof; 
and, if the duty in question is discretionary, that 
there was an arbitrary exercise or abuse of discretion .... 
(52 Am. Jur. 2nd 786, Section 466) ." 
The plaintiffs in an action to review the action of County 
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Commissioners denying an application for permit to construct 
and operate a mobile homes park, had the burden of establishing 
their cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence and it 
was incumbent upon them to show unreasonab~ess of such action. 
A court, in an action to review a County Commissioners' denial 
of permit may not substitute its judgment for that of the 
Commissioners, and should not declare the action of the 
Commissioners unreasonable unless clearly compelled to do so 
by the evidence in the light of the presumption that the 
Commissioners acted reasonably. (CRETEN v. BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF WYANDOTTE COUNTY, 204 Kansas 782, 466 P. 2d 
263; COE v. ALBUQUERQUE, 76 New Mexico 77; 418 P. 2d 545) 
It was held in the case of MUELLER v. CITY OF PHOENIX 
EX REL.PHOENIX BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, 102 Arizona 575, 435 P. 2d 
472, that a presumption of •.·alidity exists in favor of a Board 
of Adjustment determination and one who attacks such determina-
tion is met with the presumption and carries the burden of 
showing the decision to be against the weight of the evidence 
and unreasonable, erroneous, or illegal, as a matter of law. 
The Courts of this State have adopted the foregoing 
principles. (See MORRISON v. HORNE, 12 Utah 2nd 131, 363 P. 2d 
1113) 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons and upon the authorities set out herein, 
it is respectfully submitted that the Findings and Judgment 
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of the Trial Court entered June 14, 1978, should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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